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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. PAUL THOMPSON, \ 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
v. j1 c~~~~ o. 
THE CITY OF CENTERVILLE, 
a Municipal Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The pleadings before the lower court raised four 
points upon which the plaintiff claimed the Utah Munic-
ipal Bond Act of 1965 (the pertinent parts of which are 
set forth fully in appellant's brief and which will not be 
duplicated here) was unconstitutional. The lower court 
held that only that provision which enlarged the defini-
tion of "taxpayer" to include the "spouse" was uncon-
1 
stitutional. The lower court held that the provisions of 
section 7 of the act complied with the constitution in im-
plementing procedure which would insure the voting of 
"taxpayers" only. He also held that the legislature in 
including purchasers under contract as "taxpayers" 
were within their constitutional right. He also held that 
it was within the legislative power to provide that an 
elector can vote if he has paid a property tax "during the 
twelve months preceding the election" where the consti-
tution provides "in the year preceding the election." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent asks this count to reverse the hold-
ing of the lower court in the matters of the procedure for 
holding the election, the inclusion of contract purchasers 
of property as taxpayers and the period when taxes are 
paid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We agree with the statement of facts as recited by 
the appellant but at all times have objected to the affi-
davit of J. Lambert Gibson as being immaterial. 
ARGUMENT 
(I) GENERAL HISTORY OF THE CON-
STITUTIONAL PROVISION UNDER CON· 
SIDERATION. 
2 
'Ve believe it would be well at the outset to give the 
background of the constitutional provision here under 
consideration and its history since its adoption. 
We are here concerned with Article XIV, Section 
3, of the Constitution of Utah which reads as follows: 
"No debt in excess of the taxes for the current 
year shall be created by any county or subdivi-
sion thereof, or by a school district therein, or 
by any city, town or village, or any subdivision 
thereof in this State unless the proposition to 
create such debt shall have been submitted to a 
vote of such qualified electors as shall have paid 
a property tax therein, in the year preceding 
such election, and a majority of that voting 
thereon shall have voted in favor of incurring 
such debt." 
The above provision has remained unchanged since 
the adoption of the Constitution. In all the time it has 
been in force no case has been decided interpreting its 
provisions or contesting a bond election because of ir-
regularities in the voting or because of the voting of un-
qualified electors, except the very recent case of Eldred 
R. Hamilton, et al., v. Salt Lake County Sewerage Im-
provement District No. 1, 15 Utah 2d 216, 390 P.2d 235, 
decided by our Court on .March 16, 1964. The decision in 
this case went off on factual grounds and the questions 
of law to be decided in this action were reserved and left 
unanswered by the Court. The decision of the Court in 
the Hamilton case is of no assistance in the case at bar. 
An examination of the proceedings of the Constitu-
tional Convention which ended on May 8, 1895, and 
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which recommended the adoption of the constitution 
gives little light on the intentions of the framers as to 
the construction of the secion in question. It would ap-
pear that the discussions as to its meaning took place in 
committee and not on the convention floor. The only dis-
cussion is found at Pages 1141and1142 of the proceed-
ings and is as follows: 
MR. THURMAN._ It m~ans the voters who 
may be qualified by the Legislature. If I re-
member, our article on elections and suffrage or 
the bill of rights, it provides that a property 
qualification shall not be required except in cases 
of a special tax or an indebtedness. It leaves the 
Legislature, if they see fit, to fix a property qual-
ifiication in those cases. Now, in view of the fact 
that the Legislature may or may not provide for 
a property qualification, this will fit the case. 
MR. HART. 'Vhy not use the same language 
that is used in section 4, requiring them to be 
taxpayers? 
MR. THURMAN. Well, it is a question 
whether you want in the Constitution to do that. 
If you do, all right. It has been left with the 
Legislature to provide a property qualification 
and I made this fit that condition. Section 8 of 
the elections and suffrage article is as follows: 
(Reads) . Now if that be construed to fix a 
qualification absolutely without leaving it to the 
Legislature in those cases, then this amendment 
of mine meets that condition. If it be construed 
that that leaves it to the Legislature and t~e 
Legislature may afterwards provide any qual~­
fication, then my amendment meets that condi-
tion. 
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_MR. CANNON. I \Vould second the motion 
of Mr. Thurman. 
MR. SQUIRES. I would like to ask the 
gentleman from Utah if he has any objections 
to the transposition of that sentence as made by 
the gentleman from Cache? 
_MR. THURl\IAN. I have none whatever. 
I think that is a proper transposition. I thought 
it at the time. I accept that part of it. 
MR. SQUIRES. Mr. Chairman, I under-
stand a part of l\Ir. Kerr's Motion was that the 
words, "at a general election," shall come after 
the words, "have been submitted." 
l\iIR. KERR. Yes, sir. 
The amendment of Mr. Thurman was agreed 
to. 
l\1R. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I wish 
to off er an amendment to section 3, line 13, after 
the words, "received a" to "insert the words, 
"two-thirds majority." I would like to say that 
sometimes a bare majority imposes a very heavy 
burden on a large minority, and I think where 
such a large tax can be assessed that it would 
be proper that we have a two-thirds majority. 
The question being taken on the amendment, 
the committee divided and by a vote of 29 ayes 
to 42 noes, the amendment was rejected. 
It would appear that the only concern of the Con-
vention was whether or not the qualification of the elec-
tors should be limited by a constitutional provision or 
should be left to the discretion of the legislature. The 
limitation was imposed by the constitution. \Ve will dis-
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cuss the significance of this restriction later on in this 
brief. 
The only time the Legislature has enacted a law 
relative to the conduct of a bond election was enacted in 
the Laws of 1905, Chapter 107 which has to do with the 
voting for bonds for school purposes. This legislation 
uses the exact language used in Article XIV, Sec. 3, of 
the constitution in defining the qualification of voters in 
a school bond election. 
The 1965 Legislature for the first time attempted 
to implement and qualify the constitutional provision in 
enacting the Utah Municipal Bond Act. 
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 
7 OF THE ACT INSURE AND PROVIDE 
SAFEGUARDS THAT ONLY ELECTORS 
QUALIFIED TO VOTE PURSUANT TO 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF 
ARTICLE XIV, SECTION 3, WILL VOTE? 
The Supreme Court in the Hamilton case, supra, 
reserved the question as to whether or not an unsworn 
statement of an elector that he had paid a tax in the 
year preceding the election was sufficient to satisfy the 
constitutional provision. There is nothing in the opinion 
which answers or reserves the question as to a sworn 
statement regarding his status as a taxpayer. 
The provisions of Section 7 do not require that an 
elector before voting, sign an affidavit as to his taxpay-
ing status, the only time he is required to sign the affi-
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davit it when he has been challenged, there is no require-
ment for a mandatory challenge. 
There is also a provision that the registration lists 
used ma;IJ be checked against the tax rolls to determine 
taxpayers' status, it will be observed that this require-
ment is not mandatory. 
This leaves no safeguard that the person voting has 
paid a property tax within the previous year and renders 
the constitutional provision meaningless. Even if the 
registration lists are checked against the tax rolls and a 
person does not appear as having paid a tax, he can 
nevertheless vote without signing the affidavit unless he 
is challenged. "\\Te submit that to allow bond elections to 
be held with no provisions to enforce compliance to the 
constitutional mandate is to invite wholesale fraud. 
l_\;fost of the cases we have found where the payment 
of taxes is a requirement for voting are concerned with 
the payment of poll taxes. The statutes implementing 
the constitutional requirement of the payment of taxes 
almost uniformly provide that the voter must produce a 
tax receipt or if he has lost it, then sign an affidavit that 
he has lost it. In every case there is legislation imple-
menting the constitutional provisions relating to tax-
payer qualification. 
There is a compilation of the cases in 139 A.L.R. 
562. 
The case of Henry v. Oklahoma City, 108 P.2 148, 
emphasized by appellant in his brief, we do not think is 
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in point. \Ve are not attacking the use of affidavits rela-
tive to taxpayer status where such affidavits are manda-
tory as they were under the Oklahoma Statute, we are 
attacking a provision which makes no mandatory proof 
as to taxpayer status on the elector, but leaves it up to 
the election judges to challenge or not to challenge as 
they see fit. 
The same objection as made in the Henry case, 
supra, can be applied to the case of Morgan v. Board of 
Supervisors, 192 P .2d 236 (Ariz. 1948). In both cases 
the legislature to insure that only those entitled to vote 
made it an affirmative condition upon the voter to sign 
an affidavit that he was a taxpayer. To insure the proper 
conduct of an election under our Constitutional pro-
vision the legislature should make the same or a similar 
requirement as that made in Arizona and Oklahoma. 
We submit the two cases cited above are authority for 
the position taken by respondent. 
(3) IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL FOR THE 
LEGISLATURE TO EXTEND THE DEFI-
NITION OF A TAXPAYER TO INCLUDE 
THE SPOUSE OF A QUALIFIED ELECTOR 
AS SHALL HAVE PAID A PROPERTY 
TAX THEREIN, OR ONE PURCHASING 
PROPERTY UNDER CONTRACT? 
It is the contention for the plaintiff herein that the 
legislature has no power to extend by statute the class 
of persons entitled to vote under the constitutional 
mandate. The constitution uses the phrase "*** Such 
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qualified electors as shall have paid a property tax there-
in, in the year preceding such election." It would seem 
that the test as to who paid the tax would be the person 
to whom it is assessed. The statute itself seems to con-
template this test as it provides that the tax rolls may be 
checked against the registration lists. 
In the case of State ex rel. Stain v. Christensen, 
84 Utah 185, 35 P.2d 775, this Court said relative to the 
power of the legislature to enlarge or restrict a constitu-
tional provision: 
"There is eminent authority and good reason 
to support the doctrine that when a Constitution 
prescribes eligibility for an office its declarations 
are conclusive of the wijple matter whether the 
language used is affirmative or negative in 
form." 
and in a special concurring opinion it was said: 
"I think we all agree that where the Consti· 
tution prescribes and eligibility and qualifica-
tions to hold an office created by the Constitu-
tion ,the Legislature may not enlarge or diminish 
such provisions." 
In discussing the meaning to be given the words 
"property taxpayer" and related phrases, the Supreme 
Court of Arizona in the case of Morgan v. Board of 
Supervisors, et al., 192 P.2d 236 at page 242, discusses 
the meanings in that case and in cases in other jurisdic-
tions as follows : 
Appellant relies upon such cases from other 
jurisdictions as Lersch vs. Board of Public In-
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struction, 121 Fla. 621, 164 So. 281, where the 
constitutional qualification of electors was "a 
freeholder", or in Re Opinion to the Governor, 
49 R.I. 296, 142 A. 372, 373, where "ownership 
of real estate" was essential qualification. Such 
cases are clearly distinguishable from the case 
at bar where the test applied is "real property 
taxpayers." 
';\! e believe the following quotation from the 
Louisiana Supreme Court construing the term 
"property taxpayer" is more nearly applicable 
to our problem. 
"But the majority of the court think other-
wise, being of the opinion that by the term 'prop· 
erty taxpayer,' the Constitution means a person 
who is S'uch at the moment he or she offers to 
vote, and is such not ostensibly merely or, in 
other words, according to the assessment roll, 
but in reality; that in the intendment of the 
Constitution those only shall vote who are to pay 
the tax, who would be voting the tax upon them-
selves, and not upon others; those only who are 
really owners of the property at the time it is 
vited." (Emphasis supplied.) Law v. Village 
of Marthaville, La. App., 195 So. 83.85. 
A taxpayer is defined by Webster's New In· 
ternational Dictionary, 2d Ed. Unabridged, as 
"one who pays a tax." BQa,ck's Law Dictionary, 
3d Ed., gives this definition: "Taxpayer. - A 
person chargeable with a tax; one from whom 
government demands a pecuniary contribution 
towards its support." The Supreme Court of 
Montana in the case of State v. Moulton, 57 
Mont. 414, 189 P. 59, 61, said: 
" 'A taxpayer' is one who owns property with· 
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in the municipality and who pays a tax, or is 
subject to and liable for a tax." 
The following definition "A taxpayer is a 
person owning property in the State, subject 
to taxation, and on which he regularly pays 
taxes" is cited with approval in many jurisdic-
tions. See City of Pocatello v. Murray, 23 Idaho 
447, 130 P. 383, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 1050; Cas-
tilo v. State Highway Commission, 312 Mo. 244, 
279 S.W. 673; Lasityr v. City of Olympia, 61 
Wash. 651, 112 P. 752. Certainly one who is 
wholly exempt from taxation and actually pays 
no taxes, as in the instant case, cannot fairly be 
said to be a "taxpayer" and so qualify under our 
constitutional provision. 
In the case of Hicks v. Krigbaum, 13 Ariz. 
237, 108 P.482, 485, we construed the phrase 
"taxpayers of the district" as follows: 
"*** We are of the opinion, *** that both the 
legislative intent and a reasonable construction 
requires us to read the phrase to mean those who 
pay taxes upon property within the school dis-
trict." (Emphasis supplied.) 
As to whether or not a spouse qualifies as a tax-
payer where the voter must qualify as one the case of 
Tate v. Earlanger School District No. 32, Kentucky, 
49 S.W. 337, says: 
"Taxpayers as used in Ky. State, Sec. 4464, 
requiring that petition to take the sense of voters 
upon a proposition to vote a tax for a graded 
school must be signed by at least 10 legal voters 
who are taxpayers, means persons who pay taxes 
in their own name on property in their own name, 
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and does not include persons whose wives pay 
taxes." 
As to the inclusion of persons who are purchasing 
property under contract we find the case of Fugate v . 
. Mayor and City of the Town of Buffalo, 348 P.2d 76 
('Vyoming). In this case, the statute provided that only 
"property owners" were qualified to vote in a special 
class. The court held that persons purchasing property 
qualified as property owners but pointed out it was 
because they had an interest in real property, there was 
no taxpayer qualification required under the Statute. 
Under the familiar rules of constitutional and legis-
lative construction the words to be construed must be 
given their usual meaning and a constitutional restric-
tion cannot be broadened by legislative act. We submit 
that had the framers of the constitution intended to ex-
tend the vote in bond elections to persons owning an 
interest in property they would have said just that. 
There is no indication that they anticipated an extension 
of the class and they certainly did not want to give the 
power to the legislature or they would not have included 
the restriction in the constitution. It is significant that 
since the adoption of the constitution in 1895 no legis-
lature has attempted to extend the class who vote in 
bond elections. 
At the time the constitution was adopted the rela-
tionship of husband and wife was the same as it is now 
and the statutory interest of the wife in the husbands 
property, and the husbands rights of homestead were the 
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same as they are now. The relationship of buyer and 
seller is the same now as it was at that time. The consti-
tution has limited the eligible voters in bond elections 
and to now extend such class by legislation is unconsti-
tutional and the remedy is to amend the constitution in 
the orderly manner and not by legislative fiat. 
( 4) IS IT CONSTITUTION AL FOR THE 
LEGISLATURE TO PROVIDE THAT AN 
ELECTOR CAN VOTE IF HE HAS PAID 
A PROPERTY TAX "DURING THE 
Tl\TELVE MONTHS PRECEDING THE 
ELECTION," WHEN THE CONSTITUTION 
PROVIDES "IN THE YEAR PRECEDING 
THE ELECTION?" 
For some reason which is not apparent the legis-
lature in Section 6 of the Utah Municipal Bond Act, 
in defining an elector qualified him as "one who has paid 
a property tax during the twelve months preceding the 
election." The constitutional provisions provide for "in 
the year preceding the bond election," which is the lan-
guage used in setting forth the language to be used in 
the affidavit provided for in Section 7. 
The cases hold that where the word "year" is used 
it ordinarily means the calendar year. There is no clue as 
to the period intended to be covered by the members of 
the Constitutional Convention, but it is reasonable to 
assume that they used this word in its usual context, that 
is, to require that a tax had been paid within the calen-
dar year. 
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The case of Sims v. The City of Bremerton, 66 P.2d 
864 ( vV ashington) , discusses the meaning and cites cases 
which hold that the usual use of the word "year" means 
''calendar year.'' 
"The sole question to be determined is whether 
the election was 'held in the year in which the 
levy is made.' The levy must be made on the first 
:Monday in October, 1937, or within 5 days there-
after." Rem. Rev. Stat. § 9000-4. 
The decision turns upon the construction to be 
given the word "year," as used in the initiative 
measure. If it refers to the calendar year, then the 
excess levy is not authorized. If it means a year 
of 365 days, or 12 months, immediately preceding 
the making of the levy, then the excess millage 
is duly authorized. The trial court took the latter 
view, and entered judgment accordingly. 
Ordinarily, the term "year,'' when used in a 
statute, is presumed to refer to the calendar year. 
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Wellbrock, 
143 S.C. 51, 141 S.E. 103. But if the context in 
which it is used indicates that the legislative in-
tent was otherwise, the term may be construed to 
mean "fiscal year,'' a period of 365 days, or 12 
months. United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. ( 40 
U.S.) 141, 162, 10 L.Ed. 689; Hops v. Poe, :.?5 
Cal. App. 451, 143 P. 1072; Glasgow v. Rowse, 
43 Mo. 479; In re Providence Voters, 13 R.I. 
737; Paetz v. State, 129 Wis. 174, 107 N.·w. 
1090, 9 Ann. Cas. 767; People ex rel. Francis v. 
Escheman, 63 Colo. 227, 165 P. 260; United 
States v. l\ilabel Elevator Co., (D.C.) 17 F.2d 
109; Ex parte Hewlett, 22 Nev. 333, 40 P. 96; 
Bradley v. J;.Jsmeralda County, 32 Nev. 159, 104 
P. 1958, Aun. Cas. 1912C, 680. 
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The Court will observe that the Washington Court 
did not adopt the usual use because they held that to do 
so would create inequities. To hold that the use of the 
words "preceding year" in our constitution means 
''calendar year" would create no inequities and so the 
usual usage should be given as we presume the framers 
of the constitution intended. 
The following cases also discuss the terms: People 
vs. Palmer, 165 P 260, (Colorado) ; King vs. Board 
of Canvassers, 105 Atl 372 (Rhode Island) . 
CONCLUSION 
The only conclusion we think the Court can reach 
is that the Constitutional Convention and the people by 
adopting the constitution wished only those persons who 
paid the obligations incurred in bond elections should 
have the right to vote in the elections and that safeguards 
should be and would be erected to protect them. We sub-
mit that the provisions of Section 7 do not provide such 
protection. 
The extension of the provision that only persons 
who paid a property tax should vote cannot be extended 
to include persons who did not pay a tax by the legisla-
ture in view of the restriction contained in the constitu-
tion and any attempt by the legislature to do so renders 
the law unconstitutional. 
The changing of the wording by the legislature of 
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that used in the constitution to render a different meau-
ing to the word "year" is unconstitutional. 
The decision of the lower court should be affirmed 
as to the extension of the eligible taxpayers being uncon-
stitutional and reversed as to all other matters. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NED 'V ARNOCK 
of the firm 
Critchlow, Watson & Warnock 
414 'Valker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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